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WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW
forum for complainants, although employers may be deprived of the more
friendly forum2 0 Only if the Board has the exclusive right to determine
its own power over doubtful cases can its jurisdiction be truly supreme and
exclusive,2 1 and only if the Board's jurisdiction be made truly supreme and
exclusive have the courts kept faith with Congressional intent.22
This rule may work some hardship. The NLRB relief has on occasion,
proven impracticable because of the time lag imposed by a crowded
docket.23 The Board has processes available to expedite relief when the
equities justify it.24 Arguments as to defects in the procedures established
by Congress to effectuate its laws are, properly, arguments for the Congress,
not for the Court.
WILLIAM TOUSLEY SMITH
TORTS - JET AIRCRAFT EXPLOSION - RES IPSA LOQUITUR
Plaintiffs sued the United States for injuries caused by flaming fuel
which fell from an Air Force-operated Strato-Jet Bomber which exploded
in mid-air.' Relying solely upon the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur to sus-
tain their burden of showing negligence on the part of the government,
plaintiffs introduced evidence showing only the facts related above and then
rested their case; The trial court2 did not reach the question of the applica-
bility of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, but held for the government on
the ground that the government had not consented to be sued in a situation
like this. On appeal, the court of appeals affirmed the decision, but on dif-
ferent grounds. This court pointed out that the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur
'See, e.g., G.H. and E. Freydberg, Inc. v. International Ladies Garment Workers'
Union, 128 N.Y.S. 2d 470 (1954).
'The Fair v. Kohler Die and Specialty Co. 128 U.S. 22, 33 Sup. Ct. 410 (1913);
Holmes, J.: "Jurisdiction is the authority to decide a case either way . . . If the plain-
tiff makes a substantial claim under an act of Congress there is jurisdiction whether
the claim ultimately be held good or bad." 128 U.S. at 25.
'"The Board is impowered . . . to adjudicate complaints of unfair labor practices
affecting commerce... Such power of the Board shall be exclusive." HR. 3020, 80th
Cong., 1st Sess. (1947). "Congress did not merely lay down a substantive rule of
law to be enforced by any tribunal competent to apply law generally to the parties. It
went on to confide primary interpretation and application of its rules to a specific
and specially constituted tribunal and prescribed a particular procedure for investi-
gation, complaint and notice, and hearing and decision." Garner v. Teamsters, etc.
Union, 346 U.S. at 490.
"The interval of 424 days between the time a complaint was filed and the time the
Board made its ruling in 1953 is illustrative of this time lag. N.L.R.B., 18th Ann.
Rep., 4 (1953).
' § 10 (j) of the Labor-Management Relations Act empowers the Board to obtain
immediate restraining orders upon the filing of an unfair -labor practice charge. This
power has only been invoked 18 times by" the Board in the years 1948 to 1953. [As
shown in the Thirteenth through the Eighteenth Annual Reports of the NLRB.]
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is a rule of circumstantial evidence permitting the inference of negligence
to be drawn from the occurrence of an accident upon proof of certain facts;
that it is based upon human experience; and that the theory assumes that the
defendant, having exclusive control of the thing causing the injury, has
knowledge or means of information superior to that possessed by the plaint-
iff as to the cause of the accident. Taking these factors into consideration,
the court then held that since it had no knowledge, judicial or otherwise, of
what would cause a jet airplane to explode while in flight, in the absence
of evidence showing that such an accident would not occur except for
negligence, there could be no recovery.
Res ipsa loquitura can be defined generally as a doctrine which asserts
that whenever a thing which caused an injury is shown to have been under
the exclusive control or management of the defendant and within the
exclusive knowledge of the defendant, and the occurrence is such as does
not ordinarily happen if due care is used in such control, the fact of injury
itself will be deemed to afford sufficient evidence to support a recovery in
the absence of any explanation by the defendant tending to show that the
injury was not due to his want of care.3
In regard to accidents involving conventional-type airplanes, it may be
stated as a general proposition that today the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is
applied to accidents of a kind or character that do not ordinarily occur if
due care is used.4 Different conclusions have been reached, however, and
the divergence appears to have been based primarily on the opinions of
the courts as to the stage of development of aviation at the time of the
decision.
In 1930, one author wrote that in applying a rule such as res ipsa
loquitur to travel by air, the courts should take into consideration the ex-
tent of development of this type of travel as compared to other means of
travel. He pointed out that although aviation was .judicially recognized as
no longer being an experiment, it was still in its formative stage, and that
liability of the* carrier should not be measured by the same rules of law
governing transportation by land or water.
This was the attitude taken by many of the .courts which were con-
fronted with the problem in the last twenty years.6 Thus,-they held that the
doctrine of res ipsa loquitur should not apply in cases involving aircraft
accidents because of the novelty of air navigation and the absence of a
'Williams v. United States, 218 F.2d 473 (5th Cir. 1955).
2Williams v. United States, 115 F.Supp. 386 (N.D. Fla. 1953).2Note, 6 A.LR.2d. 528, 529 (1949).
Ibid.
'DAVIS, AERONAUTICAL LAW. 293 (1930).
* Cohn v. United Air Lines Transp. Corp., 17 F.Supp. 865 (D.C. Wyo. 1937); Hem-
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reliable background of experience for determining the balance of proba-
bilities, as between negligence and natural hazards as causative factors.
As time passed, though, more and more courts held that the doctrine of
res ipsa loquitur should be applied to cases involving aircraft accidents
The theory behind this position was exemplified by a 1948 decision in
which the court said that the principles of res ipsa loquitur are as applicable
to airplane crashes as they are to railroad wrecks.
When it was argued that the novelty of air navigation should preclude
the application of the rule of res ipsa loquitur to airplane accidents in view
of the fact that they may be due to unknown causes, this court pointed
out that this same argument was applied to railroads as early as 18449 when
that mode of transportation was still in its infancy. The court further noted
that the field of aviation had made great progress and that such progress
must be accompanied by responsibility.
Thus, by 1948 the majority of reported cases had reached the conclusion
that res ipsa loquitur is applicable to cases involving airplane accidents.'0
For this reason, the instant case is of great interest because it is an indication
that the entire field of jet aviation will be treated as a new field of trans-
portation which will be free of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur for some
time to come.
DAIRm B. RoTH
don v. Gregory, 190 Ark. 702, 81 S.W.2d 849 (19:, ; Deolay v. Lyford, 139 Me.
234, 29 A.2d. 111 (1942); Wilson v. Colonial Air 1fransport, 278 Mass. 420, 180
N.E. 212 (1932); Towle v. Phillips, 180 Tenn. 121, 172 S.W.2d. 806 (1943).
"Smith v. Pacific-Alaska Airway, 89 F.2d. 253 (9th Cir. 1937); Smith v. Pennsyl-
vania Cent Airlines Corp., 76 F.Supp. 940 (D.D.C. 1948); Smith v. O'Donnell,
215 Cal. 714, 12 P.2d. 933 (1932); Seaman v. Curtiss Flying Service, 231 App.
Div. 867, 247 N.Y. Supp. 251 (1930); Genero v. Ewing, 176 Wash. 78, 28 P.2d.
116 (1934); Malone v. Trans-Canada Airlines, (1942) Ont. R.453, 3 D.L.R. 369
(1942); Fosbroke-Hobbes v. Airwork, Ltd., 53 Times L254 (1937).
'Smith v. Pennsylvania Cent. Airlines Corp., 76 F.Supp. 940 (D.D.C. 1948).
The court said: "That airplane crashes may occur as a result of the actions of the
elements, or without any carelessness or deficiencies on the part of any human being,
is no doubt true. This is also probably the case in connection with railroad wrecks."
'Carpue v. London and Brighton Ry. Co., 5 Q.B. 747 (1844).
"Smith v. Pennsylvania Cent Airlines Corp., 76 F.Supp. 940 (D.D.C. 1948).
E[ummer
